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KOREMATSU AS THE TRIBUTE THAT VICE 
PAYS TO VIRTUE 
Jack M. Balkin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mark Killenbeck wants to (partially) rehabilitate the 
reputation of one of the Supreme Court’s most despised legal 
decisions, Korematsu v. United States.1  He argues that “[w]e 
should accept and teach Korematsu as an exemplar of what the 
law regarding invidious discrimination on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, and national origin should be.”2  In both Korematsu 
(and Hirabayashi v. United States)3 the Court asserted that 
classifications based on race were subject to strict scrutiny.4 But 
“[t]he majority,” Killenbeck explains, “refused to heed their own 
mandate.  In Hirabayashi they held that the government policy 
was ‘reasonable.’  In Korematsu, . . . they failed to actually 
utilize” strict scrutiny.5  “In each instance the Justices glossed 
over key facts before them, ignored pertinent information, and 
were, quite possibly, blinded by their own prejudices and 
precedents.”6 
But the fact that the Court failed at its institutional duty, 
Killenbeck argues, should not detract from the importance of its 
doctrinal achievement—the first announcement that courts 
should apply strict scrutiny to racial classifications.7  At the same 
 
        * Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment. My thanks to 
Sanford Levinson for his comments on a previous draft. 
1. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
2. Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L. 
REV. 151, 164 (2021). 
3. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
4. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of 
a single racial group are immediately suspect. . . . [and] courts must subject them to the most 
rigid scrutiny.”); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100 (“Distinctions between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions 
are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”). 
5. Killenbeck, supra note 2, at 239. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 189. 
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time, he insists, we should be deeply concerned about the quality 
of the legal decision making that sits beneath a precedent.  That, 
he asserts, is the real problem with Korematsu, and he spends 
many pages digging into the history to show how bad the 
decision-making process really was. 
Suppose, Killenbeck asks us to imagine, that we discovered 
that the Court’s work in Brown,8 Roe,9 or Grutter,10 rested on 
suppressed or fabricated facts, or misconduct by the litigants or 
the Justices.  Perhaps, he suggests, we might now treat these cases 
as “infamous.”11  In Korematsu, Killenbeck argues, “the Court 
was led down the primrose path by a record that was both 
incomplete and deceptive.  Korematsu’s place in the anticanon is 
based in significant part on these realities.  What other cases might 
we add to that roll of infamy if similar misconduct by the 
responsible agency or individuals had infected the decision-
making process?”12 
But is Killenbeck correct? Is “Korematsu’s place in the 
anticanon . . . based in significant part” on the fact that the 
decision-making process in that case was tainted?13  Killenbeck 
tries to connect the quality and integrity of advocacy and 
decision-making by lawyers and courts—or the lack thereof—to 
the honor we currently bestow (or should bestow) on the decisions 
they produce.  Thus, Korematsu is worthy of our scorn today 
because the process of decision was bad. Otherwise, its statement 
about strict scrutiny is fine, even laudable. 
One is reminded of the old joke: “Other than that Mrs. 
Lincoln, how did you like the play?” 
Killenbeck seems to be making two different claims. 
(1) Even if a case reaches a just result, it should not be 
praised if the result was caused by a decision-making process that 
was seriously tainted.  This is the suggestion he raises about 
Brown, Roe, and Grutter. 
(2) A case can be praiseworthy even if the decision-making 
process was seriously tainted, causing the result to be unjust, if 
 
8. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
11. Killenbeck, supra note 2, at 228-35.  
12. Id. at 235. 
13. Id. 
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the court states a praiseworthy doctrine.  This is his claim about 
Korematsu. 
Let’s take these claims one at a time. 
II.  IS THE QUALITY OF THE DECISIONMAKING 
PROCESS THE KEY TO OUR PRAISE OR BLAME FOR 
PAST SUPREME COURT DECISIONS? 
Killenbeck proposes that the decision-making process is, and 
should be, very important.  Yet results seem to matter—and 
matter greatly—to how we think about cases in the past.  And not 
just the particular result for the individual litigants in the case—
what seems to matter especially is the cultural meaning of a case 
in later eras.  The fact that John Marshall played fast and loose 
with the text of the Constitution and the 1789 Judiciary Act has 
not robbed Marbury v. Madison of its canonical status.14  The fact 
that the Warren Court purported to base its decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education15 on flimsy social science evidence has not 
robbed Brown of its luster as one of the crown jewels in the tiara 
of American constitutional law. 
To be sure, a familiar game in constitutional theory is 
attempting to show that anti-canonical cases like Dred Scott v. 
Sandford16 and Plessy v. Ferguson17 were badly reasoned 
according to the theorist’s favored approach.  Conversely, one 
tries to defeat opposing theories by showing that they lead directly 
to Dred Scott and Plessy.   
But bad interpretive theory has little to do with constitutional 
renown or infamy.  The reason Dred Scott is widely reviled today 
is not that it failed to conform to (1) neutral principles of 
constitutional law; (2) law as integrity; (3) process protection; (4) 
common law constitutionalism; or (5) the fifty-one flavors of 
originalism currently in play in the legal academy.  No, Dred Scott 
is reviled because of its result—that African Americans could 
never, ever be citizens of the United States because of their 
race—and because of the meaning of the case in the light of 
subsequent events, starting with the Civil War and 
 
14. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  
15. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
16. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).  
17. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
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Reconstruction.  Killenbeck wants to argue that the goodness of 
the decision-making process is, and should be, central to the 
honor and dishonor we bestow on Supreme Court decisions.18  But 
to borrow a phrase from Mae West, goodness had nothing to do 
with it.19 
The canon (and the anticanon) are constructed by cultural 
memory, and cultural memory is largely indifferent to, if not 
ignorant of, the criteria that Killenbeck is most concerned with.  
The central reason why Korematsu is anticanonical today is that 
the Court reached a deeply unjust result of which later generations 
are ashamed.  They are ashamed because twenty-first century 
America treats a commitment to racial equality as central to 
American values, even if it is a value honored more in the breach 
than in the observance.  That transformation in values occurred in 
part because of World War II, the very context in which 
Korematsu was decided.  Americans had just successfully 
defeated an overtly racist regime in Nazi Germany (which, 
ironically, as Jim Whitman explains, had based many of its ideas 
on the Jim Crow South).20  In the years that followed, more and 
more Americans became embarrassed by the country’s treatment 
of African Americans at home, as well as the wartime placement 
of Japanese-American citizens in concentration camps. 
This helps us answer Killenbeck’s question about what we 
would think if we discovered—and fully accepted—that Brown, 
Roe, and Grutter were based on shoddy decision-making.21  A lot 
depends on whether you think the results in these cases are just 
and important—if not foundational to contemporary 
constitutional law.  Most political liberals think that Brown, Roe, 
and Grutter reached results that are not only basically just, but 
important constitutional landmarks.  For that reason, liberals 
would be unlikely to abandon these cases even if we later 
discovered that “the Court was led down the primrose path by a 
record that was both incomplete and deceptive.”22  Conversely, if 
 
18. See Killenbeck, supra note 2, at 228-35.  
19. MAE WEST, GOODNESS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH IT: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF 
MAE WEST (1981); see also NIGHT AFTER NIGHT (Paramount Pictures 1932).  
20. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 2-5 (2017). 
21. See Killenbeck, supra note 2, at 228-35. 
22. Id. at 235. 
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a case reaches a very unjust result, discovering that it was 
produced by a rotten decision-making process just adds to the 
obloquy we should heap up on it.  That also explains how people 
think about Korematsu.  What the Court did was bad; the 
falsehoods presented to the Court and the faults in the Court’s 
decision-making process just make a bad decision worse. 
I have just spoken about what political liberals think.  But 
consider Roe and Grutter from the perspective of political 
conservatives deeply opposed to affirmative action or abortion.  
Suppose it were proved beyond a doubt that the Justices had 
played fast and loose with the facts or deliberately ignored crucial 
evidence that completely undermined their arguments, or suppose 
that the parties defending abortion rights or affirmative action had 
deliberately misled the Justices.  I think that opponents of 
affirmative action and abortion would be even more convinced 
that these cases were terrible blots on the Court’s reputation.  
Indeed, even without such proof, Michael Stokes Paulsen has 
argued that the decision that reaffirmed Roe, Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,23 is the very worst 
decision of all time—worse than Korematsu, worse even than 
Dred Scott.24  Showing that the decision-making process in Casey 
was defective would simply reinforce that conclusion. 
III.  WHAT CREDIT SHOULD KOREMATSU RECEIVE 
FOR ANNOUNCING THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT 
SCRUTINY FOR RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS? 
At the end of the day, Killenbeck is not arguing that 
Korematsu should be removed from the anticanon—at least not 
completely.  As we have seen, he argues that we should treat the 
Court’s decision-making process as an object lesson in how not 
to decide cases.  But he wants to bring Korematsu back into the 
positive canon in a different way: as the font (along with 
Hirabayashi) of the test of strict scrutiny in racial discrimination 
cases. 
 
23. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 
(1992). 
24. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 995, 1001 (2003). 
260 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:2 
Why should Korematsu get any credit—much less respect—
as the font of the strict scrutiny doctrine?  The United States 
Supreme Court is generally loath to overturn its cases, and 
normally tries to make lemonade out of its past lemons.  Surely 
something like that is going on with later citations to Korematsu 
and Hirabayashi.  But that does not mean that the Korematsu 
Court deserves any credit for striking a blow for racial equality.  
It’s a bit like saying that if a white person burns a cross on a Black 
neighbor’s yard, he should nevertheless get some credit for 
simultaneously shouting:  “Black Lives Matter!” 
Before we begin the discussion, we must deal with a 
threshold problem in Killenbeck’s argument.  The full name of 
the doctrine is strict scrutiny for racial classifications.  That is, the 
doctrine focuses on whether the state has made an overt or 
implicit classification, and not on whether a policy subordinates 
one social group to others.  It treats classification by the state as 
both the central vice of White Supremacy and the chief 
mechanism of contemporary racial injustice in the United States.  
Needless to say, this is not a very astute diagnosis. 
Given its defects, why should we assume that this doctrine 
has been an unalloyed good, particularly in the last forty years?  
Frankly, it hasn’t been all that good for racial justice in the United 
States.  By the end of the 1960s, when Loving v. Virginia was 
decided,25 states had stopped passing new Jim Crow laws that 
overtly classified on the basis of race.  Since then, the strict 
scrutiny doctrine has been repeatedly used to make legislative 
attempts at remedying past societal discrimination 
unconstitutional (with the Court citing both Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi in justification).26  The doctrine has been employed 
to turn Brown v. Board of Education on its head by holding that 
 
25. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
26. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204, 215-16 (1995) (striking 
down federal contracting program and citing Korematsu and Hirabayashi in justification); 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989) (striking down state affirmative 
action program for construction contracts and explaining that “[t]here are numerous 
explanations for th[e] dearth of minority participation [in construction]. . . . Blacks may be 
disproportionately attracted to industries other than construction.”); Croson, 488 U.S. at 500-
01 (citing Korematsu for the proposition that courts should not defer to vague legislative 
claims about the continued presence of racial discrimination in society); Wygant v. Jackson 
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that there is no 
compelling state interest in remedying past societal discrimination); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273 
(citing Hirabayashi). 
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voluntary plans to prevent school segregation are unconstitutional 
(with the Court citing Hirabayashi).27  Conversely, because the 
doctrine focuses on the presence or absence of racial 
classification, courts have used the strict scrutiny rule to 
legitimate legislative and executive actions that have not 
classified on the basis of race, even though they have knowingly 
perpetuated racial disadvantages for African Americans.28  In the 
Court’s view, the foreseeability—or even the actual knowledge—
that a policy will burden racial minorities (or women) is not 
sufficient.  One must show that the policy was adopted because it 
would harm these groups.29  Absent that showing, the law is 
ordinary social and economic regulation.  It deserves a 
presumption of legitimacy and constitutionality, and to impugn it 
is to disrespect the elected branches of government and attack 
democracy itself.30 
One might respond that these results have flowed from who 
sat on the Supreme Court in the past fifty years, and that another 
Court staffed with different personnel would have applied the 
doctrine quite differently.  Whether or not that is the case, it 
reinforces my point.  The doctrine of strict scrutiny for racial 
classifications is not a moral principle of racial justice and it 
should never be confused with one.  Rather, it is a doctrinal tool 
developed at a particular moment in time that soon proved 
 
27. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 731-33 
(2007) (plurality opinion) (holding that voluntary desegregation programs are 
unconstitutional racial balancing); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 743 (citing Hirabayashi for 
the proposition that voluntary attempts at racial integration should be subject to strict 
scrutiny, and that any suggestion to the contrary “is fundamentally at odds with our 
precedent”); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 751-52 (Thomas, J, concurring) (citing 
Hirabayashi and explaining that “[t]he Constitution does not permit race-based government 
decisionmaking simply because a school district claims a remedial purpose and proceeds in 
good faith with arguably pure motives”); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 758 n.10 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (citing Korematsu for the proposition that all racial classifications must be 
subjected to the “most rigid scrutiny”).  
28. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of 
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1143, 1146-47 (1997). 
29. Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
30. See Siegel, supra note 28 at 1137-38 (arguing that the intent standard is premised 
on deference to legislative majorities and an unwillingness to impugn their motivations); see 
also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976) (arguing for the relatively high bar 
of the intent standard because Title VII’s disparate impact analysis “involves a more probing 
judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and 
executives than is appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, without 
discriminatory purpose, is claimed”). 
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unequal to the forces of racial retrenchment that began in the 
1970s and have continued to this day.  It confuses classification 
with equality and constitutionality with justice.  In the hands of 
courts unsympathetic to the principle of anti-subordination, the 
doctrine of strict scrutiny for racial classifications has often 
proved to be a tool for preserving racial inequality.31  
But suppose we grant that the doctrine of strict scrutiny is, 
all other things being equal, something to celebrate.  Why should 
Korematsu get any kudos for merely saying the words?  In 
justifying the Nixon Administration’s racial policies, Attorney 
General John Mitchell is supposed to have said, “watch what we 
do, not what we say.”32  What Korematsu says is that racial 
classifications are subject to the “most rigid scrutiny.”33  What it 
does is quite another thing. 
Suppose the Supreme Court held that torture violated the 
Eighth Amendment and then proceeded to uphold torture in a 
series of cases.  It could do this in any number of ways.  It could 
(1) redefine torture so that what the government did was 
constitutional; (2) create a series of excuses (that is, “compelling 
interests narrowly tailored”) for torture; or (3) throw up a series 
of procedural obstacles—for example, limitations on judicial 
remedies, or invocation of state secrets privileges—so that later 
courts would be unable to hold unlawful future acts of torture.  If 
a court did any of these things, why is its statement that torture 
violates the Eighth Amendment particularly worthy of praise 
rather than an apology (or a cover-up) for justice denied?  Why 
does saying one thing and doing the opposite deserve any reward? 
Killenbeck’s point seems to be a constitutional version of La 
Rochefoucauld’s maxim that “[h]ypocrisy is a tribute vice pays to 
virtue.”34  When courts say the virtuous thing, even in an unjust 
cause, their statements become part of doctrine, and these 
statements can be the basis of future virtuous decision making.  
 
31. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN 
UNJUST WORLD 139, 141 (2011) (arguing that the modern law of equality is also the law of 
inequality); Siegel, supra note 28, at 1146-47 (arguing that current equal protection doctrines 
help preserve racial inequality). 
32. KEVIN L. YUILL, RICHARD NIXON AND THE RISE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE 
PURSUIT OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AN ERA OF LIMITS 145 (2006). 
33. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
34. See FRANÇOIS, DUC DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS 21 (John Heard trans., 
Dover Publications 2006) (1665), https://perma.cc/WT54-CUSS .  
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So we should thank the courts for speaking in the first place.  By 
paying tribute to constitutional virtue, courts reinforce it, even 
when they act hypocritically and unjustly. 
But the argument depends on a suppressed premise.  Two, 
actually.  The first is that courts will eventually do the virtuous 
thing.  The second is that the reason they will do the virtuous thing 
is in some way because of the initial hypocritical statement.  That 
is, hypocrisy at Time One somehow helps produce virtue at Time 
Two.  But if the causation is lacking, all we have is hypocrisy. 
Suppose that after the Court decided Korematsu, it continued 
to uphold various forms of racial discrimination in a series of 
cases, each time citing the same formula from Korematsu:  “all 
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect.  That is not to say that all such 
restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must 
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public necessity 
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial 
antagonism never can.”35 In case after case, the Court decides, for 
various reasons, that none of the challenged policies violate the 
Constitution.  Would we then view Korematsu with pride?  No.  
We would denounce it as the beginning of an odious program of 
hypocrisy, all the more odious because of the Court’s 
sanctimonious pronouncements. 
What actually happened, of course, is quite different.  
Korematsu’s and Hirabayashi’s statements reappear in cases 
striking down racially discriminatory laws and practices:  first in 
Oyama v. California36 in 1948, and then once again in Hernandez 
v. Texas37 (decided shortly before Brown), then in Bolling v. 
Sharpe,38 then in McLaughlin v. Florida39 in 1964, and then again 
in Loving v. Virginia in 1967.40  By that point it appears settled 
that racial classifications are presumptively unconstitutional. 
Should we conclude from this, however, that Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi had some influence on the results in these cases?  
Why shouldn’t we rather say that these later cases actually begin 
 
35. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
36. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948). 
37. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 n.4 (1954). 
38. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 n.3 (1954). 
39. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
40. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
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the doctrine of protecting racial equality through the strict 
scrutiny test, and that they merely cribbed convenient language 
from Korematsu and Hirabayashi to achieve this goal? In these 
later decisions, courts were making lemonade from lemons, as 
courts often do.  Indeed, what one might take away from 
Killenbeck’s article is not that we should rehabilitate Korematsu. 
It is that we should promote the first of these cases, Oyama v. 
California, into the pedagogical canon.  Indeed, if we want to 
canonize any part of Korematsu, it should be the dissents, not the 
majority opinion—as we now do with Holmes and Brandeis’ 
famous dissents in the early First Amendment cases. 
So consider another example. The test of “clear and present 
danger” appears first in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 1919 
opinion in Schenck v. United States.41  It is an application of an 
older approach that asked whether speech had a “bad tendency” 
to produce undesirable results.42 Later that year, Holmes came to 
the conclusion that the Court’s doctrine was wrong.  He began to 
dissent in First Amendment cases like Abrams v. United States43 
and Gitlow v. New York.44  He continued to employ the language 
of clear and present danger from Schenck but turned it into a 
libertarian doctrine. 
Should we say that the birth of modern First Amendment 
jurisprudence is Schenck, because it first uses the words “clear 
and present danger,” or Abrams, because it actually uses that 
language to protect free speech rights?  I would say that the 
modern tradition begins with the dissent in Abrams, not the 
majority opinion in Schenck, and that Holmes cleverly employed 
language from a case about bad tendency to build an intellectual 
case for a very different conception of freedom of speech in the 
future.45 
In the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Bradley argued that 
Congress has the power, under Section  Two of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery.46  
 
41. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
42. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 248, 285 (1997). 
43. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
44. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
45. See RABBAN, supra note 42, at 7-8 (arguing that Holmes used the phrase “clear 
and present danger” in Abrams to reject the bad tendency test and create a new theory of free 
speech without having to admit that he had departed from previous precedents). 
46. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1883). 
2021 KOREMATSU AS THE TRIBUTE 265 
But Bradley interpreted this language very narrowly, holding that 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional.47  The same 
language was then taken up, almost a hundred years later, by 
Justice Stewart in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.,48 to justify 
Congress’ power to reach private racial discrimination under the 
Thirteenth Amendment.49  Shall we say that the origins of this 
doctrine lie in the Civil Rights Cases, which denied Congress the 
power, or Jones v. Alfred Mayer, which recognized it? 
One could multiply examples, but the central point is this:  
Courts engage in all sorts of high-toned language all the time.  
They make promises of justice that they have no intention of 
keeping.  What makes this language valuable is what later courts 
actually do with this language.  What makes the clear and present 
danger test important is not Schenck—it is Holmes’ dissents that 
pave the way to cases like Brandenburg v. Ohio.50  What makes 
Korematsu’s language about strict scrutiny valuable is not the 
decision in Korematsu itself.  What makes it valuable is the later 
cases—Oyama, Hernandez, Bolling, McLaughlin, and Loving—
that cribbed the language for the opposite purpose—to further 
racial equality.  
But one might object:  surely Korematsu should get some 
credit for coining the phrase, even if it was later used for a 
contrary purpose. If the phrase had never been coined, later courts 
would have been at loss to come up with ways to protect racial 
equality. I find this argument unpersuasive.  The Court was hardly 
lacking in legal materials. The concept of strict scrutiny was 
already invented during the Lochner era as a way of protecting 
economic liberty, although the phrase itself was not used.51  And 
if one wants previous language that would help the Court actually 
protect racial equality, one might consider the following, written 
sixty years before: 
 
47. Id. at 24-25 (holding that private racial discrimination “has nothing to do with 
slavery or involuntary servitude”). 
48. 392 U.S. 409, 439-41 (1968). 
49. Id. at 441-43. 
50. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
51. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE 
INVENTION AND LOGIC OF STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 14 (2019); David E. Bernstein, The 
Conservative Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 861, 861 (2012). 
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[The Fourteenth Amendment] declar[es] that the law in the 
States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that 
all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal 
before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored 
race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily 
designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them 
by law because of their color[.]  The words of the amendment 
. . . contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, 
or right, most valuable to the colored race,—the right to 
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them 
distinctively as colored,—exemption from legal 
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, 
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which 
others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards 
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.52  
A doctrine founded on the language of Strauder v. West 
Virginia, which actually did protect racial equality, might be at 
least as valuable today as one based on Korematsu’s language of 
strict scrutiny.  In fact, starting with Strauder might be even 
better.  Strauder asserts that the law “shall be the same for the 
black as for the white,”53 but it also forthrightly acknowledges 
that the deeper problem of racial equality is one of social 
subordination—the reduction of Blacks “to the condition of a 
subject race”54—and that the positions of whites and Blacks are 
not always symmetrical. If we want language that furthers justice, 
we might look to cases that actually did a bit of justice, and not to 
cases where judges merely mouthed the words. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The point I take from Killenbeck’s article is a bit different 
from the one that he proposes.  What a decision means—and 
therefore the honor bestowed or withheld from it—is not decided 
the day it is handed down.  Like any historical artifact, its meaning 
is decided later on by what it means to later generations and what 
 
52. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880).  Cf. Sanford Levinson, 
Why Strauder v. West Virginia Is the Most Important Single Source of Insight on the Tensions 
Contained Within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST. LOUIS 
U.L.J. 603, 614 (2018) (arguing that a close reading of Strauder contains all students need 
to know about race and the Fourteenth Amendment). 
53. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307. 
54. Id. at 308. 
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they use it for.  That is especially true in a system of common law 
decision-making.  Lawyers and judges have multiple ways of 
seizing on particular language or characterizing past holdings in 
different ways—in order to make earlier cases mean different 
things over time.  What we make of Korematsu and how we use 
it is based in large part on the events that came after it.  Its place 
in history is shaped by what we, living in that history, want to use 
it for. 
Nothing stops us from giving credit to Korematsu for first 
announcing a doctrine that is useful to us today.  But nothing 
requires it either.  The larger question is this:  what should 
Korematsu mean to us today, that we find it (partially) worthy of 
praise or blame? 
Killenbeck has a distinctive answer to this question. He 
argues that we should honor good legal process and dishonor bad 
legal process, and, moreover, that we should honor doctrinal 
phrases useful to us today, no matter the results in the particular 
case that spawned them.  The lessons he wants to draw from 
Korematsu are lessons about the quality of legal decision-making, 
and the importance of lawyers and judges adhering to 
professional norms in good faith. 
These are indeed important lessons, and it is no accident that 
Killenbeck draws them at a historical moment in which the rule 
of law seems ever more threatened by the day.  But the sad fact is 
that good legal decision-making, however desirable, is not the 
same thing as justice.  And, for better and for worse, what we tend 
to remember years later about the work of courts—if we 
remember it at all—is not judges’ professional skill, their 
attention to the factual record of cases, their scrupulousness about 
procedural niceties, and their devotion to craft.  Rather, it is 
whether, in the eyes of later generations, they did justice in their 
time. 
 
